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ABSTRACT
This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of common agency games with direct externalities
between principals when they compete with nonlinear prices. Direct externalities arise when
the contracting variable of one principal directly affects the other principal’s payoff. First, we
characterize the set of pure-strategy, symmetric equilibria under complete information of an
intrinsic common agency game. This set of equilibria is large because of the presence of price-
output offers by the principals that are unchosen by the agent in equilibrium. Equilibria exist in
which principals offer out-of-equilibrium price-output choices to the agent and induce aggressive,
low-price behavior corresponding to marginal-cost pricing in the extreme case. We then show
that this equilibrium set of outputs is robust to the possibility that agent refuses any of the
offered contracts; the case of delegated agency. Second, we introduce asymmetric information
in order to rationalize existing nonlinear pricing contracts. The introduction of asymmetric
information has the effect of restricting the set of equilibrium outputs of the intrinsic common
agency game.
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1 Introduction
In many economic contexts several principals contract with a common agent and each of those
principals is directly affected by the actions selected by the common agent to the other principals.
In such a context, there are direct externalities among the principals. In this paper, we are
interested in describing the equilibrium set of such simple common agency (or “‘bidding”) games;
i.e., the set of outputs which result from a non-cooperative behavior between the principals when
the latter competes through nonlinear prices. We distinguish and analyze two variations of the
common agency game – the intrinsic common agency game and the delegated common agency
game, to use the language of Bernheim and Whinston (1986a). These games differ with respect
to the outside option of the common agent. Under intrinsic common agency, the agent can
either accept the whole set of contracts offered by the principals or reject all of the contracts.
Under delegated common agency, the agent can also choose a strict subset of principals for whom
he wants to work.
A typical example of such common agency games with externalities is that of two retailers
who distribute the output of a common manufacturer and compete on a final market. Both
retailers (the principals) independently and non-cooperatively contract with the common manu-
facturer (the agent) and the production put on the final market by one retailer affects the price
received by the other. Another example would be that of competing bidders submitting bid
schedules to a common seller in an externality context where the quantity bought by one bidder
affects the profit of another. Multi-unit auctions for electricity capacities or UMTS auctions are
two real-world examples.
We are particularly interested in the shape of the nonlinear prices that principals offer in
the equilibria of those games and on the consequences of that shape both in terms of allocations
(which outputs are produced) but also in terms of distribution (how much the agent gets).
Following the tradition of standard principal-agent models, we characterize the set of im-
plementable allocations, i.e., the set of allocations obtained as pure-strategy Nash equilibria of
the common agency game with deterministic mechanisms. We first focus on the simplest case
of intrinsic common agency where the agent can only accept both contracts or none. Under
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complete information, we find a large set of such equilibria. Remarkably, any output between
the Cournot and competitive outcomes can be sustained as part of an equilibrium of the intrinsic
common agency game in which principals compete through nonlinear prices. This multiplicity is
driven by the tariff choices available to the agent that are unchosen in equilibrium. This points
at a first role of nonlinear prices in common agency games: including such out-of-equilibrium
offers in their respective tariffs has a commitment value. The principals are able to change
their behaviors on the final good market and become more aggressive. This out-of-equilibrium
effect of contracts has no equivalent in a monopolistic screening environment and can only be
achieved through offering nonlinear price schedules with options that are unchosen by the agent.
Such extensions of tariff schedules to include more than the equilibrium choices of the agent can
generate intense competition between the principals, serving as implicit threats to prevent rival
principals from deviating from the equilibrium allocation. In the case of complete information,
a pure-strategy equilibrium requires that the agent chooses a single transfer-output allocation
from each principal, hence any offer richer than a single transfer-output offer (e.g., a nonlin-
ear price schedule) must contain unchosen offers. Without such out-of-equilibrium offers, the
Cournot outcome is the only equilibrium result of the intrinsic common agency game under
complete information. Thus, out-of-equilibrium offers can only intensify competition between
the principals.1
Under delegated agency, the agent has the additional choices of selecting only one principal’s
contract and rejecting the other’s. In that case, we demonstrate an even greater importance of
out-of-equilibrium choices. When principals are forced to use singleton contract offers (i.e., direct
revelation mechanisms) rather than menus of offers in a delegated common agency, the only pure-
strategy equilibrium (when it exists) is for head-to-head competition for the right of exclusive
agency; principals earn zero profits. With a more realistic extension of the strategy spaces to
allow for nonlinear prices, more collusive outcomes can be sustained where principals share the
market. Any output between Cournot and the competitive outcome is still an equilibrium of
1As a by-product of this analysis, common agency environments with direct externalities offer a clear failure
of the na¨ive Revelation Principle which would suggest that it is without loss of generality to look for truthful
equilibria in a game in which each principal offers direct mechanisms. Under complete information, the agent’s
type space is degenerate and the restriction to direct mechanisms is equivalent to a restriction to singleton offers
rather than menus of offers. This restriction is with loss of generality. A complete discussion of these types of
failures can be found in Martimort and Stole (2002).
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the delegated common agency game with such extensions. This result implies that equilibrium
output sets are equivalent under intrinsic and delegated common agency games with complete
information. This finding also suggests a second role of out-of-equilibrium offers: such offers
change the strategic nature of the game, making it possible to move from intense (head-to-head)
competition to more collusive outcomes.
The multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes that exist under complete information arise because
out-of-equilibrium offers are costless for a principal to include. Under complete information (and
along the equilibrium path), only one transfer-output pair from each principal is chosen by the
agent. The remaining portions of a principal’s nonlinear price schedule are irrelevant for the
offering principal’s payoffs; they only impact the rival principal’s strategy. Hence, such unchosen
out-of-equilibrium extensions are hard to justify in a complete information world, especially
under intrinsic agency where the equilibrium with no out-of-equilibrium offers Pareto dominates
all other equilibria from the principals’ collective viewpoint. With this motivation, we introduce
private information. It is well known that nonlinear prices are useful for monopoly principals
when their agent has private information; the same is true for competing duopoly principals. By
introducing private information, we introduce a cost to arbitrary nonlinear pricing, and indicate
a more standard, role of non-linear prices. We are particularly interested in looking at how this
introduction interacts with the commitment role of contracts stressed earlier.
To introduce asymmetric information in its simplest form, we assume that some parameter
of the agent’s cost function is unknown to both principals. We then derive the symmetric and
differentiable pure-strategy equilibria of the intrinsic common agency game. We find that adverse
selection introduces incentive compatibility constraints that restrict the slope of the equilibrium
tariff at all equilibrium outputs. The freedom under complete information in specifying an
extension of the equilibrium nonlinear price schedule is greatly reduced by these constraints and
the set of equilibrium outputs correspondingly shrinks. The screening role of contract somewhat
contradicts their commitment value.
Section 2 presents our common agency model. Section 3 analyzes the case of complete
information and intrinsic common agency. Section 4 deals with the case of delegated common
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agency game under complete information. Section 5 characterizes the equilibrium set with
intrinsic common agency and asymmetric information. Section 7 reviews the literature. Section
8 concludes. All proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
2 A common agency model with direct externalities
Two retailers (the principals, i = 1, 2) sell perfect substitutes on a final market. Each unit of final
good qi is produced from one unit of an intermediate good produced by a single manufacturer
(the common agent wholesaler). The principals are assumed to have all bargaining power in
offering contracts to the retailer, the implicit assumption here is that there are a large number
of potential manufacturers available to produce the inputs used by retailers.2
The common agent has a quasi-linear utility function:
U = y − θC(Q),
where y is a monetary transfer, Q = q1 + q2 is the total production of the manufacturer, and
θ is a parameter reflecting the cost efficiency of this common agent. C(·) is the agent’s cost
function which is strictly increasing and convex and has a positive third derivative (C ′(·) > 0
and C ′′(·) > 0 with C ′′′(·) > 0) and such that C(0) = 0. For technical reasons, we assume
that the In˜ada condition C ′(0) = 0 holds. Inverse demand on the principals’ market for the
homogeneous final good is denoted by P (Q) with 0 < P (0) < θ¯, P ′(·) < 0, |P ′(0)| < +∞ and
P ′′(·) ≤ 0. Without loss of generality, we assume that the retailer i produces final output at no
additional cost. Principal i’s profit is thus given by:
Vi(ti, qi, q−i) = P (qi + q−i)qi − ti
when he buys a quantity qi at price ti and his rival j 6= i puts a quantity qj on the final market.
Note that the agent’s production contracted upon by the rival principal j enters directly into
principal i’s objective function. We thus have an instance of direct contractual externalities.
This introduction of direct externalities into common agency settings with adverse selection
stands in sharp contrast with the models developed by Stole (1991) and Martimort (1992). In
2Segal and Whinston (2001) analyze a related model where bargaining power may be more evenly distributed.
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these latter papers, we both assumed that contractual externalities between the principals occur
only because the agent’s marginal utility for contractual activity i depends also on contractual
activity j 6= i, and not that this activity, qj , enters directly into i’s utility function.
We assume that principal i can only contract with the common agent on activity qi and
not on the production for the rival principal, qj . One possible justification for this assumption
is that the principal may neither have the auditing rights nor the monitoring technologies to
observe and, thus, contract on qj . A second justification is that the retail price may not be
contractible for the retailers either because resale price maintenance is not allowed or because
the retail price reflects non-verifiable after-sales services.3 In the same way, principal i cannot
contract on principal j’s contract, because the latter contract is not observable by principal i.4
A pure-strategy, deterministic contract between principal i and the agent is thus a nonlinear
schedule, Ti(qi), mapping the agent’s choice of output into the transfer paid by principal i.5
Applying a generalization of the Taxation Principle, Martimort and Stole (2002) show that
there is no loss of generality in considering this class of deterministic nonlinear prices if the
modeler is interested in common agency equilibria with deterministic mechanisms. The essence
of this Taxation Principle is that extending nonlinear prices to allow further messages on top of
quantity choices is of no additional value. From the agent’s point of view, communication-per-se
is of no value, only the payoff-relevant consequences of such communication matter. Hence,
communication can be replaced with a decentralized menu of choices that are undominated.
For example, in the seemingly more general game in which offered nonlinear price schedules
depend upon the messages sent by the agent, we could replace the mechanism with the upper
envelope of transfers without any strategic consequences for either the principals or the agent.
Since pure-strategy equilibria have a natural economic appeal, we further restrict our attention
to pure-strategy equilibria in deterministic nonlinear prices.6
3See Tirole (1988, p. 177) for a justification of this assumption.
4Katz (1987) shows in the related context of delegation games between principal-agent pairs that such reciprocal
conditioning of contracts may imply the nonexistence of a contract equilibrium.
5These mechanisms are deterministic since the agent chooses an output and not a distribution of outputs
among which the principal could randomize. Not only do these randomizations seem unrealistic in the real world
and hardly observed in the case of nonlinear pricing, but they also require that judicial courts can enforce these
randomizations. This may be quite problematic since any deviation away from the randomization which has been
contracted upon can only be detected statistically after many such realizations of the contract. Such detections
are instead not feasible in the one-shot relationships that we analyze here.
6Nonetheless, even within this class of equilibria, we find that out-of-equilibrium messages play a significant
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We normalize the common agent’s reservation utility to zero if he decides not to produce.
In a first step of our analysis, we consider a model of intrinsic common agency in which the
agent produces simultaneously for both retailers or for none. We will also test the robustness
and investigate whether the same equilibrium outputs emerge under delegated common agency,
i.e., when the agent may also choose to work with only one of the competing retailers. In this
case, the agent has the extra option of working for a single principal and that may affect the
transfers realized with either principal.
The intrinsic common agency game unfolds as follows:
1. First, nature draws θ. This parameter is known only by the common agent under the case
of asymmetric information or by all players under complete information.
2. Principals (non-cooperatively) offer nonlinear price schedules.
3. The common agent accepts or refuses both contracts.
4. If he refuses, the common agent gets his reservation utility normalized at zero. If he
accepts, he chooses how much to produce for each principal.
In the case of a delegated common agency game, stage 3 of the timing above is replaced by
3’. The common agent chooses to accept both, one, or none of the contracts.
A delegated common agency equilibrium arises if the agent gets more utility by taking both
contracts than by taking only one of the contracts. In other words, an allocation is a delegated
common agency equilibrium only if it is immune to deviations either by a principal or by the
agent where a principal is exclusively served by the common agent.
In what follows, it is useful to define the following output allocations as relevant benchmarks
under complete information on θ:
role in describing the set of equilibrium outcomes. It is noteworthy that because mixed-strategy equilibria are also
limits of pure-strategy equilibria of games of incomplete information between the principals, the pure-strategy
equilibria of such Bayesian common agency games could be obtained using the same techniques as in the present
paper.
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• For a given θ, the competitive symmetric output, qb(θ), satisfies:
P (2qb(θ)) = θC ′(2qb(θ)).
The price of one unit of final good equals then its marginal cost of production.
• The Cournot symmetric output, qc(θ), satisfies:
P (2qc(θ)) + qc(θ)P ′(2qc(θ)) = θC ′(2qc(θ)).
The marginal revenue of each competing retailer equals then the agent’s marginal cost of pro-
duction.
• The monopoly symmetric output per firm, qm(θ), satisfies:
P (2qm(θ)) + 2qm(θ)P ′(2qm(θ)) = θC ′(2qm(θ)).
Note that this is the fictional per-firm “monopoly” output; a single monopolist firm would
procure 2qm(θ) in aggregate. In that case, the marginal revenue made by a coalition of both
retailers equals the agent’s marginal cost of production. This is the outcome achieved had the
principals cooperated in their contractual offers to the common agent.
It is immediate to check that qm(θ) < qc(θ) < qb(θ) as a result of a greater exercise of market
power on the final good market when one varies outcomes from competitive, to Cournot, and
then to monopoly. Moreover, the In˜ada assumption C ′(0) = 0 and the facts that P (0) > 0 and
|P ′(0)| < ∞ ensures that qb(θ), qc(θ) and qm(θ) remain all positive. Finally, we assume that
aggregate profits are positive for those outputs. This means that:
qi(θ)P (2qi(θ)) ≥ θ
2
C(2qi(θ))
for i = b, c,m.
3 Intrinsic common agency under complete information
We start by analyzing the equilibria of the intrinsic common agency game in a setting of complete
information in which both principals know the value of θ. Hence, we are interested in equilibria
in which, for a fixed θ, the principals play a game in designing optimal nonlinear price schedules
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for the agent. To be clear, we make this dependence on θ explicit, characterizing the transfers
as functions of output, conditional on the commonly known θ: Ti(qi|θ). When we consider
the asymmetric information game in which transfers are designed without knowledge of θ, this
dependence is absent: Ti(qi).
3.1 Multiplicity of equilibria
We completely characterize the set of symmetric equilibria of the intrinsic common agency game
which are sustained with twice-differentiable nonlinear prices defined over a sufficiently large
domain of outputs. From here on, we will use the phrase symmetric, differentiable equilibrium,
to imply these restrictions.
To determine retailer 1’s optimal choice of transfer, T1(q1|θ), let us take as given the nonlinear
price T2(q2|θ) offered by principal 2 to the common agent. This allows us to define the agent’s
optimal choice of q2, given that q1 is supplied to retailer 1.
q∗2(q1, θ) ≡ arg maxq2 T2(q2|θ)− θC(q1 + q2).
Assuming that the maximand above is sufficiently regular such that its optimal solution is
uniquely characterized by a first-order condition, we can define q∗2(q1, θ) as:7
T ′2(q
∗
2(q1, θ)|θ) = θC ′(q1 + q∗2(q1, θ)) ∀ (θ, q1).(1)
Under complete information, principal 1’s best response to the schedule T2(·|θ) offered by
principal 2 consists in implementing a production q1(θ) and a transfer t1(θ) = T1(q1(θ)|θ) which
are solutions to the following problem:
max
{t1,q1}
P (q1 + q∗2(q1, θ))q1 − t1
7In the Appendix, we check that equilibrium nonlinear prices can be designed so that the agent’s program
is indeed concave. Provided that these transfer functions are defined over a broad domain to exclude corner
solutions, the first-order approach above is valid. To characterize the common agent’s behavior with a first-order
condition, we first assume that the nonlinear tariff Tj(qj |θ) offered by principal j 6= i is differentiable and second
the agent’s maximization program is concave. Henceforth, we focus a priori on common agency equilibria of the
intrinsic common agency game with nonlinear tariffs which satisfy these conditions, and then we check ex post
that the derived equilibrium tariffs do indeed justify our working assumption. In fact, the first-order approach is
valid for all outputs qi, i.e., both for outputs on and off the equilibrium path. Under delegated common agency,
we will have to be more cautious, the tariffs constructed to sustain the equilibrium outputs will not be such that
the agent’s behavior is always characterized with a first-order condition.
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subject to
t1 + T2(q∗2(q1|θ), θ)− θC(q1 + q∗2(q1, θ)) ≥ 0,(2)
where q∗2(q1, θ) is defined through the first-order condition (1). (2) is the agent’s participation
constraint which stipulates that the agent has to accept both contracts (rather than none) in
the intrinsic common agency game. Note, of course, that the problem above determines the
equilibrium values of the output and transfer but leave undetermined the options which remain
unchosen by the agent. Those options will be precisely constructed to prevent deviations by the
other principal.
The following proposition characterizes the full-information pure-strategy equilibrium of our
intrinsic common agency game with deterministic and twice-differentiable nonlinear tariffs.
Proposition 1 : Under complete information, every (and only) output q(θ) ∈ [qc(θ), qb(θ)] is
part of a symmetric, differentiable equilibrium of the intrinsic common agency game.
Moreover, in all such equilibria, the agent gets zero rent.
U(θ) = 2T (q(θ)|θ)− θC(2q(θ)) = 0.
Proposition 1 establishes that the intrinsic common agency game under complete information
is plagued with a large set of equilibria. The reason for this multiplicity is simple. Let us fix
θ which is known to all players of the game. By offering a smooth nonlinear price schedule for
this value of θ, principal i not only controls the agent’s equilibrium production of intermediate
good qi but also how the agent behaves around this equilibrium point following any unexpected
contractual offer made by principal j 6= i. This extra control of the agent’s behavior off-the-
equilibrium path changes the degree of the principals’ competition on the final market. Choices
offered by the principals that are not taken in equilibrium by the agent constrain the principals
from inducing the agent to produce a different output than that conjectured in equilibrium.
The intuition for the fact that competition between the principals raises output above the
monopoly outcome is rather straightforward. Indeed, since the common agent can always sub-
stitute away production for principal i against production for principal j, each principal pays
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at the margin too much for the good he buys from the agent. In equilibrium, the agent thus
increases the sales for each principal with respect to a situation where the principals would have
cooperated. Too much output is placed on the final market from the principals’ perspectives.
The contractual externality between the principals is positive in marginal returns to output,
resulting in excessive activities in both relationships.
In any equilibrium, a principal does not choose output below the equilibrium value because
of the threat that the agent will sell enough production to his rival to make any such attempt
of raising the price-cost margin on his units unprofitable. A lesser degree of competition is
obtained when the agent has little incentive to substitute one production against the other.
This occurs when both principals offer a relatively steep nonlinear prices around the equilibrium
value of output. In the extreme case, the quantity produced for the non-deviating principal
remains fixed following any unexpected offer and the Cournot outcome is implemented. At
the other extreme, the maximal degree of competition is obtained when productions for each
principal can be substituted one-for-one. In such a case, no principal can decrease output below
the equilibrium value without triggering a one-for-one substitution by the agent. As a result,
the retail price is fixed at its competitive value and the competitive outcome is implemented.
By varying the slope of the out-of-equilibrium transfer-output pairs, any output between the
extremes of Cournot and competitive can be implemented.
More generally, different equilibrium outputs correspond to different slopes of the symmetric
nonlinear equilibrium tariff around these equilibrium points. Indeed, by offering a nonlinear
price schedule which is conveniently extended outside the set of equilibrium outputs, principal j
can control principal i’s incentives to capture the final market. This is done at the contracting
stage by stipulating with extra transfer-output choices how the agent’s production for principal
j should respond when principal i deviates from his equilibrium offer. As argued in the proof of
Proposition 1 and stated in the corollary below, different degrees of convexity of these equilibrium
nonlinear prices correspond to different equilibrium beliefs on the degree of competition that
arises on the final market. Equilibrium outputs which are close to the competitive outcome
correspond to the least cooperative outcomes and to the flattest tariffs around the equilibrium
point. Equilibrium outputs which are close to the Cournot outcome correspond instead to the
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least competitive outcomes and the steepest schedules around the equilibrium point. In this case,
principal i has passive beliefs about how the agent changes his production of intermediate good
qj following any unexpected offer he receives from principal i. The Cournot outcome is the most
cooperative outcome achieved through bilateral contracting. We show in the Appendix that
imposing the optimality of the agent’s decision problem, together with the first-order conditions
of the principals’ programs, forces at least this minimal amount of competition between the
principals.
In the proof of Proposition 1 we demonstrate that quadratic nonlinear price schedules are
sufficient to implement the output set. From this it follows that we can parameterize the
equilibrium outputs by the value of the second derivative of the symmetric nonlinear price
T ′′(q|θ) = γ at the equilibrium point q = q(θ).
Corollary 1 : Under complete information, any symmetric equilibrium output q(θ) is such
that:




for some γ ∈ (−∞, 0].
The symmetric nonlinear price T (q|θ) which implements the equilibrium output q(θ) above
can be taken to be quadratic and then writes as
T (q|θ) = θ
2
C(2q(θ)) + θC ′(2q(θ))(q − q(θ)) + γ
2
(q − q(θ))2.(4)
Note that γ = 0 for the competitive outcome. Any incentives of a deviating principal to reduce
his own output is then offset by an extra production for the non-deviating principal as it can be
seen on the first-order condition (1) which then becomes 2qb(θ) = q1 + q∗2(q1, θ). On the other
hand, γ = −∞ corresponds to an infinitely steep nonlinear price at the equilibrium point and
this yields the Cournot outcome.
Note that changing γ modifies the commitment value of the contract. Of course, in the
present framework, choosing any γ is costless for the principal. In Section 5, we will introduce
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asymmetric information to restore a cost of changing the curvature of the nonlinear price because
it has now a screening role also.
3.2 Restrictions to singleton contract offers
It may seem odd a priori to use a whole nonlinear price schedule to control the agent in a world
of complete information. One might consider, instead, restricting attention to contracts which
are singletons: {ti, qi}. Given that such degenerate contracts have the same dimensionality as
the agent’s (for now) degenerate type space, we sometimes refer to these singleton offers as direct
mechanisms. By definition, singleton contracts (i.e., direct mechanisms) cannot contain offers
that go unused in equilibrium. Nonlinear tariffs, in contrast, allow the agent of known type θ the
opportunity to choose among a continuum of contract offers and there is not a one one-to-one
mapping between each item on a principal’s contract menu and the agent’s type. The extra
flexibility incorporated in the out-of-equilibrium extensions of the equilibrium nonlinear price
seems an artificial device to construct many equilibrium outcomes. Even if those extensions
are consistent with equilibrium behavior, one may cast some doubts on equilibria if they are
sustained with what may look like “non-credible” threats.
To see this point more clearly, let us come back on the description of the set of equilibria of
Proposition 1. The more competitive outcomes are sustained with the threat that each principal,
say principal 1, believes that his rival will induce a very aggressive behavior from the agent if
principal 1 tries to deviate from the equilibrium output. Of course, this threat is not credible if
we explicitly introduce the possibility for principal 2 to further react to principal 1’s deviation.
Without being explicit on the extensive form of such a game, it should be clear that the only
equilibrium outcome of such a process of reactions and counter actions is the Cournot outcome.8
This Cournot outcome, which is the lower bound of the equilibrium set, can also be implemented
as an equilibrium outcome of a common agency game played with singleton contract offers (i.e.,
direct revelation mechanisms) in this complete information setting.
In view of Proposition 1, singleton contract offers are not particularly attractive since they
are far from being enough to describe the whole equilibrium set. However, one can also justify
8The equilibrium concept required here is similar to the reactive equilibrium of Riley (1979).
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the use of such contracts if there exists some menu cost or more generally some cost of writing
contingencies.9 If such costs are large enough, principals will only make offers that are chosen
in equilibrium. In this case, competition between the principals leads to a unique outcome.
Proposition 2 : The Cournot output qc(θ) is the unique equilibrium of the intrinsic common
agency game under complete information when principals are restricted to singleton contracts of
the form {ti, qi}.
This result is not very surprising in view of previous discussions. With a singleton contract,
principal 2 cannot control the agent’s behavior off the equilibrium path for any unexpected
contractual offer made by principal 1. The common agent does not change his production of
intermediate q2 following such an unexpected offer. Expectations about the agent’s behavior
off the equilibrium path are passive beliefs. Obviously, these passive beliefs implement the
same outcome as that obtained with extended nonlinear prices which are very steep around the
equilibrium point.
The comparison of Propositions 1 and 2 also confirms the unavailability of the Revelation
Principle (at least a version of it with deterministic mechanisms). The set of equilibrium out-
comes achieved with richer mechanisms that allow principals’ menus to constrain offers which
are unchosen in equilibrium differs significantly from the set of equilibrium outcomes achieved
when both principals are restricted to use singleton contracts (direct mechanisms). This latter
result reinforces a finding of Martimort and Stole (1998) where we analyze less structured games
between competing principals.10 Focusing on these direct revelation mechanisms involves a quite
important loss of generality even in meaningful economic environments.11
The multiplicity of equilibria obtained with unchosen equilibrium menu items and complete
information only arises because we have considered a setting with direct externalities between the
principals who compete on the final market. Let us instead suppose that retailers have exclusive
9Of course, this argument to justify simple direct mechanisms in our setting is a bit contrived. After all, the
description of the whole equilibrium set is obtained with simple quadratic schedules which can be defined with
only three parameters.
10See also Peck (1996) for a related example in the case of a multiprincipal-multiagent model.
11The fundamental reason for the failure of the Revelation Principle is that direct mechanisms are, by definition,
unable to convey information on how a principal would like the agent to react to a deviation made by the other
principal. In the vocabulary of Epstein and Peters (1999), direct mechanisms based on the agent’s report of only
his exogenous preference information are unable to convey market information.
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territories and thus are local monopolies on segmented markets. The only interaction between
the retailers comes now from their use of a common retailer. We are in the framework of the
earlier common agency literature due to Stole (1991) and Martimort (1992, 1996) which involves
no direct externalities. In this case, the principals have no reason to precommit themselves to
affect their competition since there is no scope such a competition. The equilibrium outcome
under complete information is the same whether principals offer nonlinear prices or only direct
mechanisms.
To confirm this result, let us consider a slightly modified version of our basic model in which
principals are monopolies on segmented markets. The inverse demand on each market is now
P (qi). Let us now also redefine the monopoly symmetric output, q˜m(θ), as:
P (q˜m(θ)) + q˜m(θ)P ′(q˜m(θ)) = θC ′(2q˜m(θ)).
This output maximizes the aggregate payoff of the coalition made of both principals and the
agent, namely q1P (q1) + q2P (q2)− θC(q1 + q2).
Proposition 3 Under complete information and without direct externalities, the unique pure-
strategy symmetric equilibrium of the intrinsic common agency game achieves the monopoly
outcome, q(θ) = q˜m(θ). It can be implemented with singleton contracts.
Without direct externalities, the equilibrium contract offered by retailer 1 to the common agent
takes into account that the latter optimally adapts his production of intermediate good q1 to any
change in q2 induced by retailer 2’s deviation. A small change in q2 away from the equilibrium
value has now only a second-order effect on the aggregate payoff of the coalition between retailer
1 and the agent since output q2 does not affect directly retailer 1’s payoff. Hence, retailer 1 has
no incentive to use the agent’s behavior as an implicit veto threat against any possible deviation
by retailer 2. In this case, singleton contracts are sufficient to describe the whole equilibrium
set, which is itself a singleton.
On the contrary, in the case of direct externalities, a small change in q2 away from the
equilibrium value has also a first-order effect on the payoff of the coalition made of retailer 1
and the common agent through the change in q∗1(q2, θ) it induces. Offered, but unchosen menu
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items available to the agent generate equilibria where the principals behave more (respectively,
less) aggressively on the final good market than with direct mechanisms when this externality
is positive (respectively, negative). It is important to communicate market information on how
the principals behave for unexpected outputs and this new kind of communication can only be
achieved with offers that are not selected by the agent in equilibrium.
4 Delegated common agency under complete information
We now move to the case where the agent can choose to take only one of the equilibrium contracts
offered by the principal in addition to the choices of both contracts and non-participation. This
possibility generally leaves greater surplus to the agent and increases the strategic complexity of
the game. The greater complexity has two sources. First, to sustain a delegated common agency
equilibrium, it must be that principal i offers to the agent more when he takes both contracts
than what he gets by taking only principal j 6= i’s contract. Second, it must be that principal
i does not want to deviate in such a way that the agent no longer serves principal j. In this
sense, the existence of common (rather than exclusive) agency is determined in equilibrium and
is not exogenously fixed.
It is useful to begin with the simpler strategy space of singleton contracts in the delegation
game. To this end, we first consider singleton contracts (direct mechanisms) in the delegated
agency games, i.e., we restrict each of the principals to offering a single transfer-output pair,
{ti(θ), qi(θ)}. Such mechanisms do not allow for any offers to remain unchosen in equilibrium; in
other words, there are no out-of-equilibrium messages, to use the language of mechanism design.
After analyzing this simple setting, we turn to nonlinear transfer-output schedules which allow
for out-of-equilibrium (i.e., unchosen) offers.
4.1 Singleton contracts
To illustrate the role of out-of-equilibrium messages in this context, it is useful to first analyze
what happens when unchosen offers are not allowed.
Proposition 4 Equilibria in complete information, delegated common agency games with sin-
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gleton contracts:
• There does not exist any pure-strategy equilibrium in which the agent serves both principals;
• If
2qm(θ)P (2qm(θ))− θ(C(4qm(θ))− C(2qm(θ))) < 0,(5)
then there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium of the delegated common agency game in which
the agent serves each principal with equal probability, produces 2qm(θ) and receives an
equilibrium transfer t(θ) = 2qm(θ)P (2qm(θ)) from the selected principal. The agent gets a
strictly positive equilibrium rent equal to
U(θ) = 2qm(θ)P (2qm(θ))− θC(2qm(θ)) > 0,
and the principals make zero profits.
The intuition behind the non-existence of a common agency equilibrium where both princi-
pals are served in equilibrium is the following. Starting from an allocation where both retailers
are simultaneously served by the agent, one of the principals would always find it beneficial to
deviate upwards and request more output from the common agent so that the latter chooses not
to serve the other principal. The mere possibility of not being served by any given principal,
say principal 1, can be viewed as a particular extension of the direct mechanism involving a null
contractual option (t, q) = (0, 0). This option can be used by principal 2 to open new strategic
possibilities, inducing the agent to refuse principal 1’s contract.
In a pure-strategy equilibrium with direct mechanisms augmented with the (t, q) = (0, 0)
option, the principals who are identical in all respects compete fiercely for the exclusive service
of the agent because each principal wants to induce the agent to take this null option in his
rival’s contract. Conditional on the agent being exclusive, the preferred output chosen by the
selected principal is of course the monopoly output which maximizes the payoff of the coalition
between the selected principal and the agent. The game has now a Bertrand flavor but what is
auctioned off between the principals is the right to be exclusively served by the agent. Hence,
the equilibrium output is not the competitive outcome but instead the monopoly outcome.
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Given that an exclusivity clause cannot be imposed at the outset by the principals, the
existence of such an equilibrium with exclusivity can only be guaranteed if the agent does not find
it optimal to take both exclusive contracts from the principals simultaneously. This imposes the
condition (5), which simply means that the agent does not find it optimal to take both contracts
because the benefit of taking a second contract, namely the added transfer received from a
second principal 2qm(θ)P (2qm(θ)) is lower than the incremental cost θ(C(4qm(θ))−C(2qm(θ)))
incurred when serving a second principal.12
4.2 Nonlinear prices and out-of-equilibrium (unchosen) offers
The non-existence of a common agency equilibrium can nevertheless be restored if the desire
of any given principal to increase output and being exclusively served by the agent can be
controlled with a convenient extension of the equilibrium schedule offered by the other principal.
Compared with Section 3, out-of-equilibrium messages are not only useful to expand the set of
feasible equilibrium outputs as before but now also change the strategic nature of the game,
transforming it from a head-to-head competition for the right to be exclusively served into a
split-award auction where both retailers are simultaneously active in equilibrium.
We now show that there always exist pure-strategy equilibria such that the final market
is shared between both principals. Such equilibria implement outputs which are the same as
under intrinsic agency. From an allocative point of view, the option of refusing one contract
does not affect the equilibrium set. Of course, this new outside option for the agent has some
redistributive consequences since it changes the allocation of surplus between the principals and
the agent.
Proposition 5 Under complete information, every (and only) output q(θ) ∈ [qc(θ), qb(θ)] can
be obtained as a symmetric delegated common agency equilibrium sustained with a piece-wise
differentiable nonlinear price Td(q|θ) such that Td(0|θ) = 0.
12When (5) does not hold, no pure strategy equilibrium exists but we have not been able to characterize the
mixed-strategy equilibria of the game if any.
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In all such equilibria, the agent gets a strictly positive rent:
U(θ) = 2Td(q(θ)|θ)− θC(2q(θ)) > 0.
The construction of the out-of-equilibrium messages incorporated in the equilibrium nonlin-
ear price is such that any incentive for upward output deviations by either principal disappears.
To do so, it is necessary that any incremental production that a deviating principal, say principal
1, may request from the agent is compensated by a decrease in the revenue the deviating princi-
pal may make for those extra-units. This occurs when the agent substitutes enough production
for principal 2 to keep the total production high enough and the price on the final market low
enough. Of course, keeping the total production large enough cannot be possible if the only
extra option available from principal 2 is for the agent to refuse the latter’s contract as it was
the case in the game restricted to direct mechanisms. Options which are unchosen in equilibrium
are now clearly needed to sustain the delegated common agency equilibria.
Once the equilibrium nonlinear price offered by a given principal is conveniently extended
downwards towards the null option (0,0) to prevent upwards deviation by the other principal,
the only remaining difficulty is to be sure that, in equilibrium, the agent is indifferent between
taking both contracts and taking only one of the contracts. This condition is of course needed
since, otherwise, a principal can always reduce the transfer he offers to the agent and gain with
such a deviation. This last issue is solved by extending the equilibrium nonlinear price upwards
in such a way that the agent is just indifferent between taking both contracts and taking only
one and producing for the selected principal a quantity much greater than in equilibrium.
Propositions 4 and 5 also show that, when exclusivity cannot be explicitly contracted upon,
out-of-equilibrium choices offered to the agent allow the principals to avoid the head-to-head
competition and increase their profits. Clearly, for the principals, those extensions allow more
collusive outcomes in which the market is shared and positive profits are realized by both
competing retailers. In this respect, direct mechanisms are not particularly attractive since they
force principals to behave more aggressively than what they can do with conveniently extended
mechanisms.
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5 Intrinsic common agency under asymmetric information
In Section 3.2, we argued that nonlinear prices may suffer from a credibility problem under
complete information. One way to make credible any output-transfer pair offered in equilibrium
by either principal is to make sure that this option is relevant for a particular type of the agent.
The standard motivation for looking at nonlinear prices comes then from the fact that the
principal is unable to discriminate among the different possible types of the agent in a private
information self-selection setting.
Under asymmetric information, the extension of a nonlinear price in the neighborhood of an
equilibrium output is not, a priori, without cost as it is under complete information. Outputs in
this neighborhood are themselves equilibrium outputs for nearby values of the agent’s type which
arise with some probability. The competing mechanism design problem is now posed in a much
more plausible and structured environment. It therefore seems natural to study common agency
games under adverse selection in the hope of getting sharper predictions on the equilibrium set.
We thus turn to the case of asymmetric information in the framework of our intrinsic common
agency game. The agent’s efficiency parameter θ is now his private information. It is drawn
from the set Θ = [θ, θ¯] according to a common knowledge distribution F (·) with positive density





> 0 for all θ ∈ Θ.
Because θ is unobservable to the principals, T (q) cannot be designed as a function of θ; hence,
we use T (q) rather than T (q|θ).
5.1 Computing best-responses
Before proceeding to a systematic investigation of the pure-strategy equilibria of the common
agency game under asymmetric information, we propose a general algorithm which helps to
characterize the best-response of a principal to any pure-strategy nonlinear contract offered by
his rival.
For any nonlinear price T2(·) offered by principal 2, there is indeed no loss of generality
in looking for principal 1’s best-response within the class of singleton contracts (i.e., direct
mechanisms) of the form {t1(θˆ), q1(θˆ)} where θˆ is the agent’s report to principal 1. Any payoff
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that principal 1 can achieve when he offers a mechanism with some general communication
space can also be achieved with such a direct revelation mechanism. Here, we simply apply
the standard Revelation Principle to determine the outputs implemented by principal 1 at his
best response to a given deterministic nonlinear price T2(·) offered by principal 2. Of course, in
equilibrium, nonlinear prices must be best responses to each other. To validate the first-order
approach, we extend the nonlinear schedules offered by both principals for out-of-equilibrium
outputs.13
However, different nonlinear prices offered by principal 2 affect differently the agent’s incen-
tives to produce for principal 1 and therefore principal 1’s incentives to distort his consumption
of intermediate good 1 for informational reasons. In other words, for a given coalition between
a principal and the agent, the trade-off between extraction of the agent’s information rent and
maximization of the aggregated payoff of this coalition depends on the other contract signed by
the agent.
To capture this effect mathematically in a clear manner, let us thus define the agent’s indirect
utility function vis-a`-vis principal 1 as:
u1(q1, θ) = max
q2
T2(q2)− θC(q1 + q2).(6)
This indirect utility function gives the maximal payoff of an agent with type θ when his produc-
tion for principal 1 is q1 and when he chooses his output q2 optimally. When T2(·) is defined
over the whole real line, differentiable and sufficiently concave, q∗2(q1, θ) is again defined by the
first-order condition (1). Note that different nonlinear tariffs T2(·) correspond to different in-
direct functions u1(q1, θ) and therefore to possibly different best responses by principal 1. For
notational ease, we leave the dependence of u1(q1, θ) on principal 2’s contract implicit.
For a given indirect utility function, finding principal 1’s best response to T2(·) is a straight-
forward task using the methodology of single principal-agent optimal contracting problems. The
13Note that under asymmetric information the chosen portion of the nonlinear price schedule associated with
the equilibrium direct mechanisms {ti(θ), qi(θ)} is of the form ti(q−1i (qi)) and is defined only over the domain Qi =
{qi|qi = qi(θ) for some θ}. Using these limited, non-extended nonlinear prices when computing best responses
would require the modeler to compute the principal’s benefit of making a subset of types with non-zero measure
bunch on the corner of the tariff offered by his rival. Such analysis would require modifying (1) as a characterization
of the best choice of the agent for any output chosen in the rival’s nonlinear price. Stole (1991) shows that these
extensions are not be needed in the case of indirect externalities when there is sufficient concavity present.
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standard implementability conditions must be satisfied by this contractual best response. The
only difference with standard contracting problems comes from the fact that principal 1 suffers
from the direct externality exerted by principal 2’s contracting. However, from a technical point
of view, the difficulty is to ensure that principal 1’s problem is concave since, again this concav-
ity is endogenous and depends on the price schedule T2(·) offered by principal 2. We will first
assume throughout that this concavity is satisfied and we will propose a sufficient condition so
that it is so.
For convenience, let us also define the U(θ) as the common agent’s information rent:
U(θ) = max
θˆ∈Θ
t1(θˆ) + u1(q1(θˆ), θ).(7)
It turns out that the implementability conditions of principal 1’s best response can be expressed
more easily in terms of the information rent-output pair {U(θ), q1(θ)} rather than in terms of
the transfer-output pair {t1(θ), q1(θ)}. The following lemma is standard in the self-selection
literature.
Lemma 1 : If u1qθ(q1, θ) ≤ 0 for all (q1, θ), a pair {U(·), q1(·)} is implementable if and only if,
for all θ ∈ Θ, the following two conditions are satisfied:
• first-order condition,
U˙(θ) = u1θ(q1(θ), θ);(8)
• second-order condition,
q1(θ) is non-increasing.(9)
In addition to choosing the pair {U(θ), q1(θ)}, the principal also chooses an optimal region of
participation for agency, [θ, θ0], which may may exclude a positive measure of agents, (θ0, θ].
These three instruments, {U(θ), q1(θ), θ0}, are chosen at a best response by principal 1 is there-








subject to (8)-(9) and
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U(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ0](10)
which is the agent’s participation constraint. We will use this program throughout when com-
puting the best response of each principal. Note that we implicitly assume at this stage that
any principal wants to serve all the types. We give the condition for which it is so in the next
proposition.
The standard single-crossing or Spence-Mirrlees property, u11θ(q1, θ) ≤ 0, which is usually
assumed to obtain a well-behaved monotonic solution to principal principal 1’s problem, can
no longer be postulated a priori. Instead, the implicit dependence of u1(q1, θ) on principal 2’s
contract implies that this single-crossing property is endogenous and may or may not arise at
the equilibrium of the common agency game. Nevertheless, we focus on pure strategy equilibria
where this single-crossing property emerges in both indirect utility functions vis-a`-vis either
principal.
5.2 Equilibria set
For further references, we define the incomplete-information analogues to qc(θ) and qm(θ). There
is no corresponding analogue for qb(θ) because no information rents are captured by firms when
competitive outcomes are implemented.
• The virtual Cournot symmetric output as q˜c(θ) such that:







• The virtual monopoly symmetric output as q˜m(θ) such that:







The first output schedule corresponds to the standard Cournot outcome when costs have
been replaced by virtual costs to capture the effect of informational asymmetries between the
principals and their agent. The second output schedule corresponds to the monopoly outcome
when those virtual costs are counted twice. Under our assumptions on cost and demand, both
q˜c(θ) and q˜m(θ) converge to zero as θ goes to θ¯. Because the most efficient type is θ, there is no
incentive distortion for the most efficient type: q˜c(θ) = qc(θ) and q˜m(θ) = qm(θ).
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Note also that the assumptions P (0) < +∞, |P ′(0)| < +∞ and C(0) = 0 imply necessarily
that qb(θ), q˜c(θ), and q˜m(θ) all remain positive for any value of θ. This property will also be
satisfied by the equilibrium outputs of the intrinsic common agency game.
We can now state the following proposition which describes the set of common agency sym-
metric equilibria of the game under asymmetric information.
Proposition 6 : Assume that the concavity of the principals’ problem and the agent’s single-
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with the boundary condition q(θ) ∈ [q˜c(θ), qb(θ)]. Then, q(θ) is a strictly decreasing and positive
output schedule implemented in a symmetric equilibrium of the intrinsic common agency game
for all participating agents, θ ∈ [θ, θ0]. θ0, in turn, is the unique root of




if a root exists, and is θ0 = θ otherwise.
The corresponding equilibrium nonlinear price schedule, T (·), is uniquely determined by the




≥ 0 for the corresponding schedule T (·), the principals’ programs are concave,
the agent’s single-crossing property holds, and the necessary conditions above are also sufficient
for characterizing equilibrium outputs.















both principals want to deal with all types of the common agent: θ0 = θ.
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Under asymmetric information, the slope of the symmetric equilibrium nonlinear price T (q)
is defined at any equilibrium point q(θ) in such a way that the following first-order condition
characterizes the agent’s choice for all θ:
T ′(q(θ)) = θC ′(2q(θ)).(12)
By specifying an adverse selection problem around any value of θ, the slope of the equilib-
rium schedule in the neighborhood of this value θ is completely defined. The convexity of the
equilibrium schedule at an equilibrium point is a priori not as free as under complete informa-
tion. Differentiating (12) with respect to θ yields the following expression defining the second





The convexity of the nonlinear price which describes the degree of competition between the
principals is thus completely determined at any equilibrium point by how equilibrium output
evolves in the neighborhood of this equilibrium point. This shows that the screening value of
the contract definitively affects its commitment value.
The slope of this output schedule is itself determined by two forces playing simultaneously.
First, as in standard one-principal-agent models, each principal wants to reduce the amount of
good he requests from the agent in order to limit the latter’s information rent. This incentive
distortion depends on the distribution of the agent’s types through its hazard rate. Second, as
under complete information, principal 1 has also strategic incentives to increase his profit on the
final market by strategically employing the agent against principal 2.
As a result of the principals’ incentives to reduce the production they request from the
common agent for informational reasons, the equilibrium set is now strictly within two boundaries
q˜c(θ) and qb(θ). The lowest bound q˜c(θ) is a natural extension of the Cournot outcome under
asymmetric information, had costs been replaced by virtual costs. Note that it is only at θ
that the equilibrium outputs correspond to the whole set between the competitive outcome and
modified Cournot. It is thus legitimate to say that adverse selection significantly reduces the
equilibrium set for other values of θ.
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Proposition 7 : The output schedules q(θ) implemented in any symmetric differentiable equi-
librium of the intrinsic common agency game are such that
q˜c(θ) < q(θ) < qb(θ)
∀θ ∈ (θ, θ0]. In particular, q(θ) remains positive for all values of θ.
Note that as θ0 increases (i.e., more heterogeneous agents are served), qb(θ) converges to
q˜c(θ), so q(θ) is more tightly bounded by the presences of incomplete information.
In the case of delegated agency, it is immediate to see that q(θ) again emerges as the equi-
librium allocation function, but on a possibly different participation set (i.e., for a possibly
different θ0). Elsewhere in Martimort and Stole (2003), we confirm that this equality is true
in general, and that (weakly) more participation occurs under delegated agency than intrinsic
agency. Hence, θD0 ≥ θI0. Hence, our focus on intrinsic agency is not without much economic
consequence for the present purposes of this paper.
6 A review of the literature
Two different kinds of externalities are at play simultaneously in the common agency models
we have analyzed. First, because of decreasing returns to scale in the common manufacturer’s
cost function, each principal’s action (the output he requests from the manufacturer) affects the
agent’s profit. There are thus indirect contractual externalities as in Stole (1991), Martimort
(1992 and 1996) and Mezzetti (1997). Second, and contrary to this earlier common agency
literature, each principal’s action also affects the other principal’s utility function since both
retailers compete for final good on the same market. Hence, there are now also direct contractual
externalities between the principals. We have shown that indirect externalities are enough to
create a role for out-of-equilibrium messages even under complete information and to justify a
failure of the standard version of the Revelation Principle where the agent is asked to report his
type only.
Our study of nonlinear pricing games is actually more general than it first appears, and it has
something to say about equilibria in large communication-mechanism common agency games.
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To see this, we can use a variation of the Taxation Principle, following the approach in Martimort
and Stole (2002).14 There, we demonstrate that although the Revelation Principle cannot easily
be applied to common agency environments,15 it is not difficult to use an extension of the
Taxation Principle from agency theory – what we call the Delegation Principle – to characterize
the set of equilibria from all message games. Specifically, any equilibrium in a any common-
agency communication-mechanism game is also an equilibrium to a game in which each principal
chooses to offer to the agent a menu of distributions of allocations limitations) and the agent
chooses an element from each principal’s offered menu.16
The fact that each principal can only observe and contract upon the agent’s action that he
directly cares about distinguishes our paper from other common agency games under complete
information like Bernheim and Whinston (1986b), Grossman and Helpman (1994), and Laussel
and Le Breton (2001). In those papers, each principal can contract on the whole array of
actions of the agent. This assumption implicitly requires that all those actions are observable
by each principal. In the retailers-manufacturer example of this paper, this would mean that
every quantity sold by a rival can be observed by a given principal: a strong assumption.17
Instead of being substitutes, the contractual activities of the different principals are thus perfect
complements. It is well-known from this literature that, under complete information, the so-
called truthful equilibrium implements the output which maximizes the aggregate payoff of the
grand-coalition made of the retailers and the manufacturer, i.e., the monopoly outcome. The
fact that the equilibrium set we found is far away from this outcome measures the consequence
of imperfect bilateral contracting based on individual productions.
The modeling environment that we have considered can be viewed as complementary of
14A similar idea is independently developed in Peters (2001).
15It would require a universal message space along the lines developed in Epstein and Peters (1999).
16The main restriction in our analysis over general communication mechanism games, therefore, is to limit the
principals to offering menus with only deterministic outcomes (i.e., nonlinear price-quantity schedules) rather
than allowing for more general menus of distributions (i.e., nonlinear price-quantity lottery schedules). We are
not aware of any equilibrium generated by lotteries that is not also generated by nonlinear prices, but at present
we cannot state that this restriction is without loss of generality. A secondary restriction is that the nonlinear
pricing equilibrium gives rise to smooth quantity allocations as a function of type. Given that monotonicity of
outputs is a typical requirement of incentive compatibility, and that such monotonicity implies that nonlinear
pricing schedules are almost everywhere smooth, this restriction is not overly strong in our opinion.
17One could argue that the observation of price contains the necessary information to infer the production of
other retailer when there are only two of those. First, as we argued above, resale price maintenance contracts
may be forbidden for anti-trust reasons. Second, price does not convey enough information when there are more
than two retailers competing.
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standard models in the vertical contracting literature (see Hart and Tirole (1990), McAfee and
Schwartz (1994) and Segal (1999) among others). Contrary to most of this literature,18 we give
all bargaining power to retailers in designing contracts with their common manufacturer. The
two game forms compare as follows. With the agent having all bargaining power, the manu-
facturer cannot credibly commit to the monopoly trades which would maximize the aggregate
payoff of the overall coalition if offers made to each retailer are private. In equilibrium, each
principal must form beliefs about what offers are made to his rivals when he contemplates an
agent’s deviation away from the equilibrium trade. This leeway in specifying beliefs plays the
same role as the extension of the nonlinear prices that we have analyzed in our framework. It
allows to generate many more outcomes than what can be achieved when beliefs are passive. In
the latter case, the Cournot outcome can still be implemented just as what can be done in our
model with no out-of-equilibrium extension. In a recent paper, Segal and Whinston (2001) have
even shown that the equilibrium sets of both games coincide. Looking for robust predictions
on the equilibrium sets, they also show that any outcome between Cournot and competitive
can be sustained independently of the allocation of bargaining power between the principals
and the agent. As in our paper, the finding of these equilibria relies heavily on the fact that
principals offer menus with out-of-equilibrium options. Contrary to us, Segal and Whinston use
discontinuous nonlinear prices to sustain equilibrium outcomes whereas, both under intrinsic
and delegated common agency, we show that continuity may be kept.
Our findings on the multiplicity of equilibria of our common agency game are also clearly
related to the literature on delegation in competing principal-agent pairs with publicly observable
contracts analyzed in Katz (1987), Ferschtman, Judd and Kalai (1991), Caillaud, Jullien and
Picard (1995) and Ku¨hn (1997) among many others. This literature also shows that a large
set of equilibria can be sustained when competing principals try to influence the behavior of
their respective agents before agents play a game on their behalf. In common agency games,
the interaction between the principals’ contracts comes directly from the fact that the common
agent’s utility function depends on both contractual activities.
Also, the fact that head-to-head competition in the delegated common agency game can be
18An important exception is Segal and Whinston (2001).
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avoided with extended nonlinear prices is related to Wilson (1979) and Anton and Yao (1989)
findings that bidders in multi-unit auctions can use their bidding strategies to achieve some
relatively collusive outcomes.
In their study of equilibrium in supply schedules, Klemperer and Meyer (1989) have used
ex ante uncertainty as a way to select among the many equilibria of the game under complete
information. This bears some resemblance with our analysis and in particular with our desire
to make credible any contractual option as being an equilibrium option for some types of the
agent. With supply functions, there is a uniform price clearing the market whereas, in our
model, different quantities are bought by a principal at different prices. Second, we assume
adverse selection instead of ex ante uncertainty highlighting the dual role of a schedule as giving
strategic advantages and reducing information rents.
7 Conclusion
This paper has contributed to the analysis of common agency games by stressing the role of
out-of-equilibrium messages in changing the degree of competition between rival principals.
First, we have characterized the set of equilibria outcomes of an intrinsic common agency
game under direct externalities between the principals and complete information. Any outcome
between the Cournot and the competitive outcomes can be realized as an equilibrium outcome
with nonlinear prices conveniently extended out of the equilibrium output.19 Nonlinear prices
have thus a commitment value because they affect the degree of competition between principals.
Second, we have shown that the equilibrium outputs of the intrinsic common agency game
remain equilibrium outcomes under delegated common agency, i.e., when the agent may refuse
one of the principals’ contracts. The distribution of surplus is however different than under
intrinsic common agency. The role of out-of-equilibrium messages is then to insure that the
competition between the principals is soft enough so that the head-to-head competition which
takes place with direct mechanisms is replaced by more collusive outcomes.
19In an earlier version of this paper, we showed that, for complements, the equilibrium set corresponds to the
whole set of outputs between the monopoly and the Cournot outcomes.
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Both under intrinsic and delegated common agency, the source of the multiplicity of equilibria
is the principals’ desire to manipulate the agent’s behavior even out of the equilibrium. These
manipulations can only be achieved with indirect mechanisms stipulating transfers for out-of-
equilibrium output choices. As a consequence, direct revelation mechanisms fail to replicate the
equilibrium outcomes achieved with indirect mechanisms: a failure of the Revelation Principle
in common agency games.
Finally, under intrinsic common agency, we have introduced asymmetric information in order
to refine within the set of these possible equilibria and characterized those equilibria. The
shape of the nonlinear price is now constrained by incentive compatibility. This does somewhat
restrict the set of symmetric equilibrium outcomes. The screening role of the contract somewhat
undermines its commitment value. Of course, a relevant extension would be to analyze whether
delegated and intrinsic common agency games have the same equilibrium sets under asymmetric
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1:
We take as given the nonlinear price T2(q2|θ) offered by principal 2 to the common agent and
suppose that T2(q2|θ)− C(q1 + q2) is sufficiently concave w.r.t. q2 so that there exists a unique
maximizer defined by the first-order condition, (1). In any differentiable equilibrium, the first-
order condition is necessary; we check below that the agent’s objective function is sufficiently
regular to guarantee that this condition is also sufficient. Define
q∗2(q1, θ) ≡ arg maxq2 T2(q2|θ)− C(q1 + q2, θ).
Under complete information, principal 1’s problem is thus:
max
{t1,q1}
P (q1 + q∗2(q1, θ))q1 − t1
subject to
t1 + T2(q∗2(q1, θ)|θ)− θC(q1 + q∗2(q1, θ)) ≥ 0.(14)
In principal 1’s problem, (14) is binding because the principal wants to reduce the transfer he
offers to the agent as much as possible. Substituting the value of t1 from this binding constraint
into the maximand, the principal’s objective function can be written as a function, V (q1, θ), of




V (q1, θ) =(15)
q1P






+ P (q1 + q∗2(q1, θ))− θC ′(q1 + q∗2(q1, θ)) = 0.




(q1, θ). A necessary condition
for the optimality of the agent’s problem is the first-order condition (1). We will show that
ex post the agent’s objective is globally concave for the equilibrium nonlinear price that we
construct. Hence, this condition is also sufficient. Differentiating (1) w.r.t. q1 yields the following
relationship, true for all (q1, θ):
(T ′′2 (q
∗
2(q1, θ)|θ)− θC ′′(q1 + q∗2(q1, θ))
∂q∗2(q1, θ)
∂q1
= θC ′′(q1 + q∗2(q1, θ)).(16)
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From (1) and (16), the RHS of (15) above can be simplified, and for a symmetric equilibrium
such that q1(θ) = q2(θ) = q(θ) and T1(q|θ) = T2(q|θ) = T (q|θ), we obtain our key equation for
characterizing the equilibrium allocation:
q(θ)P ′(2q(θ)) + P (2q(θ)) = θC ′(2q(θ))− q(θ)P
′(2q(θ))θC ′′(2q(θ)
T ′′(q(θ)|θ)− θC ′′(2q(θ) .(17)
• Necessary conditions for a symmetric, differentiable equilibrium. In any differentiable equi-
librium, it is necessary that the agent’s objective function is locally concave at the equilibrium
choice. This imposes two conditions on the Hessian of this symmetric problem computed at the
equilibrium value (q(θ), q(θ)):
T ′′(q(θ)|θ)− θC ′′(2q(θ)) ≤ 0 for all θ.(18)
and
(T ′′(q(θ)|θ)− θC ′′(2q(θ)))2 ≥ (θC ′′(2q(θ)))2 for all θ.(19)
We use these necessary local concavity conditions to derive the boundaries of the equilibrium
sets. Substituting the condition (18) into (17) and noting that C ′′ > 0:
q(θ)P ′(2q(θ)) + P (2q(θ)) ≤ θC ′(2q(θ)).(20)
From C(·) being convex, P ′(·) < 0 and P ′′(·) ≤ 0, (20) implies that q(θ) ≥ qc(θ). Inserting (19)
into (17) yields:
P (2q(θ)) ≥ θC ′(2q(θ)).(21)
From C(·) being convex, P ′(·) < 0 and P ′′(·) ≤ 0, (21) implies that q(θ) ≤ qb(θ). Hence, only
outputs q(θ) ∈ [qc(θ), qb(θ)] can be part of an equilibrium.
• Sufficient conditions for a symmetric, differentiable equilibrium. For any fixed θ and q(θ) ∈
[qc(θ), qb(θ)] we construct quadratic transfer schedules T (q|θ) = α + βq + 12γq2 that form an
equilibrium and generate q(θ) as a symmetric equilibrium output.
Assuming that the principals’ and the agent’s programs are each concave, q(θ) will be chosen
by the agent if and only if the agent’s first-order condition is satisfied:
β + γq(θ) = θC ′(2q(θ)).
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The posited transfer function will be chosen by each principal if and only if each principal’s
first-order condition (17) for q is satisfied
q(θ)P ′(2q(θ)) + P (2q(θ)) = θC ′(2q(θ))− q(θ)P
′(2q(θ))θC ′′(2q(θ)
γ − θC ′′(2q(θ) ,
















−2C ′(2q(θ)) + q(θ) (P (2q(θ))− θC
′(2q(θ)))C ′′(2q(θ))






q(θ) (−P (2q(θ)) + θC ′(2q(θ)))C ′′(2q(θ))




θ (P (2q(θ))− θC ′(2q(θ)))C ′′(2q(θ))
P (2q(θ))− θC ′(2q(θ)) + q(θ)P ′(2q(θ)) .
These values will comprise an equilibrium if both the agent’s program and the principals’ pro-
grams are concave.
Concavity of agent’s program: Global concavity of the agent’s problem requires that
γ − θC ′′(q1 + q2) ≤ 0 for all (q1, q2),(22)
and
(γ − θC ′′(q1 + q2))(γ − θC ′′(q1 + q2)) ≥ θ2(C ′′(q1 + q2))2 for all (q1, q2).(23)
These conditions are jointly satisfied if and only if T ′′(q(θ)|θ) = γ ≤ 0. Hence, providing that
γ ≤ 0, the agent’s program is globally concave for any (α, β). Note that the above value of
γ is non positive if q(θ) ∈ [qc(θ), qb(θ)], so the agent’s program is concave for the constructed
equilibrium tariff schedule.











′′(q1 + q∗2(q1, θ))
γ2
(γ − θC ′′(q1 + q∗2(q1, θ)))2
+ 2P ′(q1 + q∗2(q1, θ))
(
γ
γ − θC ′′(q1 + q∗2(q1, θ))
)
+q1P ′(q1 + q∗2(q1, θ))
(
γθC ′′′(q1 + q∗2(q1, θ))
(γ − θC ′′(q1 + q∗2(q1, θ)))3
)
− θC ′′(q1 + q∗2(q1, θ))
(
γ




The first term is negative thanks to P ′′(·) ≤ 0. The third term is negative since γ ≤ 0 and
C ′′′ ≥ 0. The second term is negative since γγ−θC′′(q1+q∗2(q1,θ)) > 0 and P
′(·) < 0. Taking into
account that C ′′ ≥ 0, the fourth term is also negative. Hence, each principal’s program is strictly
concave and so the posited quadratic tariffs form a Nash equilibrium and implement q(θ). 2
Proof of Proposition 2: Assume that principal 2 offers the direct revelation mechanism
{t2(θ), q2(θ)}, then principal 1’s problem is:
max
{t1,q1}
P (q1 + q2(θ))q1 − t1,
subject to
t1 + t2(θ)− θC(q1 + q2(θ)) ≥ 0.(24)
Again (24) is binding at the optimum of principal 1’s problem. Inserting the corresponding
value of t1 into principal 1’s objective function, observing that the corresponding maximand is
concave in q1 and optimizing with respect to q1, yields:
q1P
′(q1 + q2(θ)) + P (q1 + q2(θ)) = θC ′(q1 + q2(θ)).(25)
In a symmetric equilibrium, we obtain q1(θ) = q2(θ) = qc(θ). 2












The first-order condition T ′2(q∗2(q1, θ)|θ)−θC ′(q1 + q∗2(q1, θ)) = 0 characterizes the agent’s choice
of output. In a symmetric equilibrium, conjectures must be correct and thus q∗2(q, θ) = q(θ) =
q˜m(θ). It is routine to check that the same outcome can be implemented with direct mechanisms.
2
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Proof of Proposition 4 :
• Nonexistence of pure-strategy equilibria with each principal served.
Suppose that a pure-strategy symmetric equilibrium exists with direct mechanisms and that
it sustains a common agency outcome where the agent contracts simultaneously with both
principals. Let (t(θ), q(θ)) denote the associated equilibrium transfer and output. In such an
equilibrium, principals decrease as much as possible the transfers they offer to the agent so that
the agent’s equilibrium rent satisfies:
U(θ) = 2t(θ)− θC(2q(θ)) = max{0, t(θ)− θC(q(θ))}
where the outside option of the agent on the right-hand side allows the agent to choose to
contract with one principal or none of them, depending upon which produces greater payoffs.
It follows that the greater outside payoff is obtained when the agent refuses only one contract.
To see this, note that if it were not the case, we would have 2t(θ) − θC(2q(θ)) = 0 or t(θ) =
θC(2q(θ))/2 > θC(q(θ)), where the latter inequality follows from the convexity of costs. Hence,
t(θ) − θC(q(θ)) > 0 and the relevant outside option is serving one principal. Using this result,
we get
t(θ) = θ(C(2q(θ))− C(q(θ))).(26)
Consider now an upward deviation in output by principal 1, that is q1 > q(θ) and the associated
transfer
t1 = θ (C(q1 + q(θ))− C(q(θ))) .
Then, from the above definition of t(θ), we have
t(θ)− θC(q1 + q(θ)) < −θC(q1),
so
t1 + t(θ)− θC(q1 + q(θ)) < t1 − θC(q1),
and the agent prefers not to take principal 2’s contract given principal 1’s deviation. The profit
of the deviating principal who chooses q1 > q(θ) is:
V (q(θ), θ) = q1P (q1)− θ (C(q1 + q(θ))− C(q(θ))) .
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The profit along the equilibrium path, however, is thus:
V (q1, θ) = q(θ)P (2q(θ))− θ (C(2q(θ))− C(q(θ))) .
The cost components of the principal’s payoffs are continuous as q1 increases above q(θ), but
the revenues discontinuously jump upwards as q1 increases above q(θ) if q(θ) > 0. Hence, the
principal’s profits jump upwards for a slight deviation upward from the conjectured equilibrium
output, q(θ). We conclude that there does not exist a pure-strategy equilibrium in which both
principals contract with the agent.
• Existence of pure-strategy equilibria in which each principal served is exclusively served with
equal probability.
Consider now that the possibility of a pure-strategy equilibrium in which both principals
compete head-to-head for the exclusive service of the agent. A necessary condition for equi-
librium is that the principals bid away all of their profit from being exclusive and each offers
a direct revelation mechanism with associated transfer t(θ) = 2qm(θ)P (2qm(θ)) and quantity
2qm(θ). Such an offer is the most attractive that a principal can make. Moreover, with these
offers, the agent is willing to randomize (equally in a symmetric equilibrium) between the prin-
cipals, providing that the agent earns more rents than when contracting with both principals
simultaneously. This provision is satisfied if and only if
4qm(θ)P (2qm(θ))− θC(4qm(θ)) < 2qm(θ)P (2qm(θ))− θC(2qm(θ))(27)
or
2qm(θ)P (2qm(θ))− θ(C(4qm(θ))− C(2qm(θ))) < 0,(28)
which is condition (5) of the proposition. Note that because we have assumed that the monopoly
outcome yields a positive profit
2qm(θ)P (2qm(θ))− θC(2qm(θ)) > 0(29)
and since C(4qm(θ)) − 2C(2qm(θ)) > 0 from C(·) convexity, the two inequalities (28) and (29)
are not mutually exclusive. 2
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Proof of Proposition 5:
Let us fix q(θ) ∈ [qc(θ), qb(θ)] and let us construct the equilibrium schedule Td(·|θ) that
sustains this output in a symmetric equilibrium under common agency.
• Upwards deviations by principal 1 and extension of Td(·|θ) below the equilibrium
output: We first construct the equilibrium schedule Td(·|θ) under delegated common agency
so that principal 1 does not want to induce more production from the agent. For simplicity, we
denote by Td(θ) = Td(q(θ)|θ) the equilibrium value of the transfer.
Let also denote by Π(θ) the principal’s equilibrium payoff and by U(θ) the agent’s equilibrium
rent (which must be positive since the agent has always the option of refusing both contracts).
This rent is constructed below so that the agent is indifferent between taking both contracts
and that offered by principal 2 only.
By definition, we thus have:
q(θ)P (2q(θ)) + Td(θ)− θC(2q(θ)) = Π(θ) + U(θ).
Let us construct the extension of Td(·|θ) for q ∈ [0, q(θ)] in such a way that principal 1 gets a
constant payoff if he deviates upwards and offers q1 ≥ q(θ) for q1 not too large so that q∗2(q1, θ)
remains positive (this upper bound is made precise below). The payoff of the deviation is
V (q1, θ) = P (q1 + q∗2(q1, θ))q1 + Td(q
∗
2(q1, θ)|θ)− θC(q1 + q∗2(q1, θ))− U(θ)
where q(θ) ≥ q∗2(q1, θ) ≥ 0 for such a q1. It is constant for all q1 greater than q(θ) if ∂V∂q1 = 0.
This writes as (15) and taking into account (1) which characterizes the agent’s behavior for
q1 ≥ q(θ), we obtain the following differential equation mapping any q1 into the agent’s best




′(q1 + q∗2(q1, θ)) + P (q1 + q∗2(q1, θ))− θC ′(q1 + q∗2(q1, θ))
q1P ′(q1 + q∗2(q1, θ))
.(30)
With the boundary condition q∗2(q(θ), θ) = q(θ), (30) defines the out-of-equilibrium outputs
below the equilibrium value which are needed to hold the pure strategy equilibrium if the
principal 1 deviates.
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Lemma 2 : For all q1 ∈ [q(θ), q˜m(θ)], we have q∗2(q1, θ) ∈ [qc(q1, θ), qb(q1, θ)] where
q1P
′(q1 + qc(q1, θ)) + P (q1 + qc1(q1, θ)) = θC
′(q1 + qc(q1, θ))
and
P (q1 + qb1(q1, θ)) = θC
′(q1 + qb(q1, θ)).
First, note that qc(q1, θ) and qb(q1, θ) are both decreasing functions of q1. Moreover, by direct
identification, we have qb(q1, θ) = 2qb(θ)− q1. Also, qc(2qm(θ), θ) = 0.
Take then a solution to (30) which starts at q1 = q(θ) ∈ [qc(θ), qb(θ)]. This solution remains
above qc(q1, θ). Suppose on the contrary that it does not and denote by q′1 the first value of





= 0. Since q′1 > q(θ) and
∂qc(q′1,θ)
∂q1
< 0, we have q∗2(q′1 − , θ) < qc(q′1 − , θ) for  small enough. A contradiction.
q∗2(q1, θ) remains also below qb(q1, θ). Suppose on the contrary that it does not and denote








= −1 and, it can be checked that this equality is true for all derivatives of those two
functions. Hence, q∗2(q1, θ) = qb(q1, θ) for all q1 in a small neighborhood of q′′1 . A contradiction.
2
As a consequence of Lemma 2, we have q∗2(q1, θ) = 0 only for q1 ≥ q˜(θ) where q˜(θ) > 2qm(θ).
Note that for such q1, we have
V (q1, θ) = q1P (q1) + Td(0|θ)− θC(q1)− U(θ)
and that V (q1, θ) is decreasing in q1 so that those large deviations in q1 are not beneficial for
principal 1 either. Also, because q∗2(q1, θ) > qc(q1, θ), q∗2(q1, θ) is decreasing in q1. Let denote
by φ(q2) its inverse function which is also differentiable, decreasing over [0, q(θ)] and such that
φ(q(θ)) = q(θ).
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Given a schedule q∗2(q1, θ) which is defined above, using (1) and the initial condition Td(0|θ) =




θC ′(φ(q2) + q2)dq2
for q ∈ [0, q(θ)]. In particular, the equilibrium value of the transfer is
Td(θ) = Td(q(θ)|θ) =
∫ q(θ)
0
θC ′(φ(q2) + q2)dq2.(31)
•Downwards deviations by principal 1 and extension of Td(·|θ) above the equilibrium
output: Denote by U(θ) the agent’s equilibrium rent in a delegated common agency game.
Since, the agent takes both contracts in equilibrium, this rent is thus:
U(θ) = 2Td(q(θ)|θ)− θC(2q(θ)).(32)










C ′(φ(q2) + q2)(1 + φ˙(q2)− φ˙(q2))dq2 − C(2q(θ))
)
.






C ′(q1 + q∗2(q1, θ))dq1
)
.(33)
For q > q(θ), let us extend Td(q|θ) linearly as
Td(q|θ) = Td(θ) + θC ′(q∗)(q − q(θ))
for some q∗ to be defined below such that q∗ > q(θ). Note that Td(q|θ) is continuous at q(θ) but
not necessarily continuously differentiable and indeed it won’t be (see Figure 1).
With such a definition, the agent chooses q2 = q∗ if he serves only principal 2. Indeed,
choosing any q2 ≤ q(θ) is dominated by choosing q(θ) This yields him a positive rent from
taking only principal 2’s contract given by:
U2(θ) = Td(θ) + θ(C ′(q∗)(q∗ − q(θ))− C(q∗)).
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To be sure that principal 1 has reduced his own transfer as much as possible in equilibrium,




C ′(q1 + q∗2(q1, θ))dq1 − C(q˜(θ)) = ψ(q∗) = C ′(q∗)(q∗ − q(θ))− C(q∗).(34)
It is easy to check that ψ(·) is strictly increasing. Moreover, ψ(q(θ)) = −C(q(θ)) < ∫ q˜(θ)q(θ) C ′(q1 +
q∗2(q1, θ))dq1 − C(q˜(θ)) since q∗2(q1, θ) ≥ 0 on the relevant interval [q(θ), q˜(θ)], and ψ(q˜(θ)) =
C ′(q˜(θ))(q˜(θ)−q(θ))−C(q˜(θ)) > ∫ q˜(θ)q(θ) C ′(q1 +q∗2(q1, θ))dq1−C(q˜(θ)) since q1 +q∗2(q1, θ) increases
with q1 for q1 ≥ q(θ) and thus
∫ q˜(θ)
q(θ) C
′(q1 + q∗2(q1, θ))dq1 < C ′(q˜(θ))(q˜(θ) − q(θ)). Hence, there
exists a unique q∗ > q(θ) such that (34) holds.
Note also that q∗ < 2q(θ). Indeed, we have ψ(2q(θ)) = C ′(2q(θ))q(θ) − C(2q(θ)) >∫ q˜(θ)
q(θ) C









C ′(q1 + q∗2(q1, θ))dq1 − C(q˜(θ)) =
−C(2q(θ)) because ∂q∗2(q1,θ)∂q1 < 0.
Let us now consider a deviation by principal 1 to induce less production by the agent than
in the equilibrium, q1 < q(θ). For q1 ∈ [q∗ − q(θ), q(θ)], the agent chooses q∗2(q1, θ) = q(θ) and
principal 1 gets from such a deviation:
V (q1, θ) = P (q1 + q(θ))q1 + Td(θ)− θC(q1 + q(θ))− U(θ).
Since q1 ≤ q(θ) ≤ qb(θ), the best of such deviation is q(θ) itself. For q1 ∈ [0, q∗− q(θ)], the agent
chooses q∗2(q1, θ) = q∗ − q1 and principal 1 gets from such a deviation:
V (q1, θ) = P (q∗)q1 + Td(θ) + θC ′(q∗)(q∗ − q(θ))− θC(q∗)− U(θ)
which is increasing and maximized over [0, q∗−q(θ)] for q1 = q∗−q(θ). Since V (·, θ) is continuous
in q1, the best downward deviation by principal 1 is q(θ) itself.
• Agent’s Behavior: First, note that





C ′(q + φ(q))dq forqi ≤ q(θ).
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Let us denote the agent’s payoff as
J(q1, q2) = Td(q1|θ) + Td(q2|θ)− θC(q1 + q2).
We want to prove that J(·) is maximized for q1 = q2 = q(θ). For that, we will decompose the
(q1, q2) space into several pieces.
Note first that, if qi ≥ q(θ) for at least one i, we have:
∂J(q1, q2)
∂qi
= θ(C ′(q∗)− C ′(q1 + q2)) ≤ 0
if and only if q1 + q2 ≥ q∗. On the rectangle [0, q(θ)] × [q(θ),+∞(, the maximum of J(·) is
achieved for q2 = q∗ − q1 if q1 ∈ [0, q∗ − q(θ)] and it is worth
Jˆ(q1) = Td(q1|θ) + Td(θ)− θC ′(q∗)q1 − C(q∗).
This maximum of J(·) is instead achieved for q2 = q(θ) if q1 ∈ [q∗ − q(θ), q(θ)].
We can proceed similarly on the rectangle [q(θ),+∞(×[0, q(θ)] by permuting indices.
Finally, given that q∗ < 2q(θ), J(·) is maximum at (q(θ), q(θ)) on the rectangle
[q(θ),+∞(×[q(θ),+∞(.
We now prove that Jˆ(·) is maximum for q1 = q∗ − q(θ). This will finally allow us to restrict
the finding of the optimal outputs on the square [0, q(θ)] × [0, q(θ)]. First notice that, for
q1 ∈ [0, q∗ − q(θ)],
Jˆ ′(q1) = θ(C ′(q1 + φ(q1))− C ′(q∗)).
Moreover, Jˆ ′′(q1) = θC ′′(q1 + φ(q1))(1 + φ′q1)). Since
∂q∗1(q2,θ)
∂q2





(30) (where indices have been permuted), we have Jˆ ′′(q1) < 0 and Jˆ ′(q1) ≥ Jˆ ′(q∗ − q(θ)). That
q∗ < 2q(θ) and φ(·) decreasing imply that φ(q∗ − q(θ)) ≥ φ(q(θ)) = q(θ). Finally, we have
Jˆ ′(q∗ − q(θ)) ≥ θ(C ′(q∗ − q(θ) + q(θ))−C ′(q(θ))) = 0. Hence, Jˆ(·) is increasing on [0, q∗ − q(θ)]
and thus maximized for q1 = q∗ − q(θ).
Let us now consider the maximum of J(·) on the domain [0, q(θ)]× [0, q(θ)]. In fact, we have:
∂J(q1, q2)
∂q1
= θ(C ′(q1 + φ(q1))− C ′(q1 + q2)) ≥ θ(C ′(q1 + q(θ))− C ′(q1 + q2))
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since φ(q1) ≥ q(θ) and thus ∂J(q1,q2)∂q1 ≥ 0 since q(θ) ≥ q2. Similarly,
∂J(q1,q2)
∂q2
≥ 0 and thus J(·)
is maximized at (q(θ), q(θ)). 2
• Schedules:
On Figure 1 below, we have drawn the equilibrium schedule constructed under delegated
common agency. It is important to notice that the curve is not differentiable everywhere and is

































XXXy slope θC ′(2q(θ))






Figure 1: Nonlinear price schedule Td(·|θ).
Proofs of Propositions 6 and 7:
• (8) indicates that U(·) is decreasing because u1θ(q1(θ), θ) = −C(q1(θ)+q∗2(q1(θ), θ)) < 0. Hence,
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C(q1(z) + q∗2(q1(z), z))dz.








f(θ)C(q1(θ) + q∗2(q1(θ), θ))dθ.
The objective function to be optimized pointwise becomes a function of q1 only, namely:





















u11θ(q1, θ) = 0.(35)
Using the Envelope Theorem:
u11(q1, θ) = −θC ′(q1 + q∗2(q1(θ), θ))







is well-defined from the fact that T2(·) is twice differentiable. Inserting into (35)
yields for a symmetric equilibrium such that q1(θ) = q2(θ) = q(θ):















However, in a symmetric equilibrium, T ′(q(θ)) = θC ′(2q(θ)) for all θ. Differentiating w.r.t. θ
yields:
(T ′′(q(θ))− θC ′′(2q(θ)))q˙(θ) = θC ′′(2q(θ))q˙(θ) + C ′(2q(θ)).
Inserting into (36) yields (11).







Differentiating under the integral gives us the condition that θ0 solves V (q(θ0), θ0) = 0 is a
solution exists in Θ and θ = θ otherwise.
• We now establish the bounds on q(θ). We prove that q(θ) ∈ [q˜c(θ), qb(θ)] for all θ. First we
show that if q(θ) ∈ [qc(θ), qb(θ)], then the solution to (11) starting from this point remains in
the set [q˜c(θ), qb(θ)] for all θ.
Suppose that there exists θˆ, the first value of θ greater than θ, such that q(θˆ) = qb(θˆ). We
have then:
q˙(θˆ) = − C
′
2θC ′′
< q˙b(θˆ) = − C
′
2θC ′′ − 2P ′ < 0.
Hence, q(θ) > qb(θ) for θ ∈ (θˆ − , θˆ) where  is small enough. A contradiction.
Suppose that there exists θˆ, the first value of θ greater than θ, such that q(θˆ) = q˜c(θˆ). We
have then:






> 0, and C(·) convex. Hence, q(θ) < q˜c(θ) for θ ∈ (θˆ − , θˆ) where  is small
enough. A contradiction.
Second, we prove that no solution exists with q(θ) 6∈ [qc(θ), qb(θ)]. Consider (36) evaluated
at θ. The following two relationships emerge (where the inequalities follow from applying the
agent’s local second-order condition):
q(θ)P ′(2q(θ)) + P (2q(θ))− θC ′(2q(θ)) = −q(θ)P ′(2q(θ))
(
θC ′′(2q(θ))
T ′′(q(θ))− θC ′′(2q(θ))
)
< 0,
P (2q(θ))− θC ′(2q(θ)) = q(θ)P ′(2q(θ))
(
θC ′′(2q(θ))
T ′′(q(θ))− θC ′′(2q(θ)) + 1
)
> 0.
Hence, qc(θ) ≤ q(θ) ≤ qb(θ).
• We now turn to the global concavity of the agent’s problem: Using (11), we have:
T ′′(q(θ))− θC ′′(2q(θ)) = θC
′′(2q(θ))
q(θ)P ′(2q(θ) + P (2q(θ))− C ′(2q(θ))
(









Since q(θ) > q˜c(θ), the R.H.S. above is negative. Moreover, |T ′′(q(θ))−θC ′′(2q(θ))| ≥ θC ′′(2q(θ))
since P (2q(θ)) ≥ θC ′(2q(θ)) when q(θ) ≤ qb(θ).
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The facts that T ′′(q(θ)) − θC ′′(2q(θ)) ≤ 0 and that |T ′′(q(θ)) − θC ′′(2q(θ))| ≥ θC ′′(2q(θ))
prove that the Hessian of the type θ-agent’s problem is negative semi-definite at (q(θ), q(θ)) for
any θ and any equilibrium schedule q(θ). Hence, the agent’s objective function is locally concave
at this point. To have global concavity of the agent’s problem, we need more. This Hessian
must be negative semi-definite at all pairs (q1, q2). To prove this, let us write the equilibrium
nonlinear price as T (q) =
∫ q
q(θ0)
θ(z)C ′(2z)dz + θ0C(2q(θ0))/2 where θ(q) is the inverse function
of an equilibrium schedule q(θ) which is well defined since q(·) is decreasing. An agent with
type θ wants to maximize J(q1, q2) = T (q1) +T (q2)− θC(q1 + q2). The corresponding first-order
conditions are:
J1(q1, q2) = θ(q1)C ′(2q1)− θC ′(q1 + q2) = 0
J2(q1, q2) = θ(q2)C ′(2q2)− θC ′(q1 + q2) = 0.
Clearly, those first-order conditions hold as equalities when q1 = q2 = q(θ). Moreover, we have:
J11(q1, q2) = 2θ(q1)C ′′(2q1) + θ˙(q1)C ′(2q1)− θC ′′(q1 + q2)
and
J12(q1, q2) = −θC ′′(q1 + q2).
We observe that α(q1) = 2θ(q1)C ′′(2q1)+ θ˙(q1)C ′(2q1) has the opposite sign as 2
θC′′(2q(θ))
C′(2q(θ)) q˙(θ)+1
for all q1 in the range of q(·). This last term is equal to
−P (2q(θ)) + θC ′(2q(θ))
P (2q(θ)) + 2q(θ)P ′(2q(θ))−
(
θ + 2F (θ)f(θ)
)
C ′(2q(θ))
which is positive since q˜c(θ) ≤ q(θ) ≤ qb(θ). Hence J11(q1, q2) < 0 for all (q1, q2). Similarly,
J22(q1, q2) < 0 for all (q1, q2). Moreover, we have
J11(q1, q2)J22(q1, q2)− (J12(q1, q2))2 = α(q1)α(q2)− θC ′′(q1 + q2)(α(q1) + α(q2)) > 0
since α(qi) < 0 for i = 1, 2.
For outputs which lie outside the range of the equilibrium schedule q(θ), i.e., which are greater
than q(θ) the equilibrium tariff is extended in a quadratic (and continuously differentiable) way
so that these conditions also hold.
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• We now check that the indirect utility function vis-a`-vis either principal satisfies the Spence-
Mirrlees single-crossing property, uiiθ(q, θ) ≤ 0 for all q and i = 1, 2. In fact, we have, for any
equilibrium point q(θ′):
uiiθ(q(θ







Omitting arguments, and using symmetry, the bracketed term in the RHS above is
−C
′(2q(θ′) + 2θ′C ′′(2q(θ′))q˙(θ′)
C ′(2q(θ′) + θ′C ′′(2q(θ′))q˙(θ′)
.
Using (11), this RHS becomes: P (2q(θ′))− θ′C ′(2q(θ′))
q(θ′)P ′(2q(θ′))− F (θ′)f(θ′)C ′(2q(θ′))

which is negative since q(θ′) ≤ qb(θ′) for all θ′. Because T (·) is extended over the whole real line
in a quadratic way, the latter inequality holds for all q even those for which there does not exist
θ′ such that q = q(θ′).
• Let us provide conditions ensuring the concavity of V (q1, θ) with respect to q1. We can rewrite:
V (q1, θ) = q1P (q1 + q∗2(q1, θ)) + T2(q
∗


















2P ′(q1 + q∗2(q1, θ)) + q1P



























′(q1 + q∗2(q1, θ))−
F (θ)
f(θ)









T ′′(q∗2(q1,θ))−θC′′(q1+q∗2(q1,θ)) where T (·) is a symmetric equilibrium nonlinear price







> 0 (obtained from (22)).







> 0, P ′ < 0 and P ′′ ≤ 0. The





• Finally, principal 1 wants to deal with type θ as long as the the virtual surplus he draws from
that is positive. This means that θ∗, the upper bound of that set is at the corner θ¯ when:
V (q(θ¯), θ¯) > 0.
Using that, in a symmetric equilibrium 2T (q(θ¯) = θ∗C(2q(θ¯)), we must have:
q(θ¯)P (2q(θ¯))−
(
θ¯
2
+
F (θ¯)
f(θ¯)
)
C(2q(θ¯)) > 0.
2
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